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Abstract
Targeted social media advertising based on
psychometric user profiling has emerged as an
effective way of reaching individuals who are
predisposed to accept and be persuaded by the
advertising message. In the political realm, the use of
psychometrics appears to have been used to spread
both information and misinformation through social
media in recent elections in the U.S. and Europe,
partially resulting in the current, public debate about
‘fake news’. This paper questions the ethics of these
methods, both in a commercial context and in the
context of democratic processes. The ethical approach
is based on the theoretical, contractarian work of John
Rawls which serves as a lens through which the author
examines whether the rights of citizens, as Rawls
attributes them, are violated by this practice. The
paper concludes that within a Rawlsian framework,
use of psychometrics in commercial advertising on
social media platforms is not necessarily unethical,
since the user enters freely into a contract that allows
for psychometrics to be used, and because this type of
advertising is not necessary for full participation in
society. The opposite is the case for political
information, and thus, the paper concludes that use of
psychometrics in political campaigning violates
several of Rawls’ ethical maxims.

1. Introduction
Analysis of a social media user’s behavior through
collection of data is now a common practice, and has
been subject to both criticism and scholarly inquiry for
many years. The construction of a social profile on a
user is one of the main monetization tools for providers
of social media services and the tools of this trade are
constantly evolving [1],[2]. Recently, some attention
has been paid to the concept of psychometrics and their
utility in predicting personal traits of social media
users to subsequently predict their behavior when
exposed to hyper-targeted advertising [3],[4]. The
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psychometric trend has spilled over from advertising
and marketing into other realms of strategic social
media persuasion, most notably politics.
As this type of hypertargeting moves from the
commercial sphere into the sphere of public discourse
and democratic processes, it may be prudent to begin
interrogating the ethics of the methods being used. The
question is whether there is an ethical difference
between collecting data and conducting psychometric
analysis with the purpose of persuading receivers of
advertisements versus persuading voter groups.
Though it can be argued that both situations have a
similar, asymmetrical power balance, there are
contextual differences that separate the two types of
persuasion scenarios, and this may prove to have
consequences for the normative evaluation of the
methods on a societal level. Persuasion tactics in
elections are part of the democratic process itself and
for this reason, it can be argued, they deserve a higher
level of normative scrutiny, particularly since a
substantial part of the literature in moral and political
philosophy is dedicated to the construction of a just
society and fairness in democratic processes.
In this paper, I will use the work and positions of
one of the foremost thinkers to have ventured into the
normativity of democratic processes in the modern era,
John Rawls, to interrogate the ethics of using
psychometrics as part of a strategy to impact voter
groups, whether this is in an election or e.g. as part of
an information warfare tactic. Rather than embark on
mission similar to the impressive work done by
Robinson [2] on a Rawlsian approach to data mining in
general, I have chosen to focus on this particular
method of data collection and analysis, as I believe it in
itself carries some very interesting ethical dilemmas.
From the starting point of an overview of the use,
norms and ethics of psychometrics in the commercial
social media sphere, I will follow the trajectory of
psychometric persuasion tactics into democratic
processes and cast a light on some problematic issues
that arise from this transition.

Page 1722

2. Psychometrics for advertising on
common social media platforms.
Psychometrics, understood broadly as personality
traits and behaviors that can be evaluated/measured
and scored for different purposes, is a field with a long
history that can be traced all the way back to Darwin
[5].
While there are some standard psychometric
models (more on this later), oftentimes social media
platforms will create their own metrics to build the
social profile needed to increase the accuracy of
targeted advertising. The latter term is used in this
paper to describe advertising and marketing efforts in
varying expressive forms that attempt to address the
needs of the individual as directly as possible. Several
studies have shown the high efficacy of targeted
advertising [6],[7],[8],[9] and the economy that has
emerged around targeted advertising also shows that
advertisers at least have a perception that it is effective.
Psychometrics are really a dimension of microsegmentation, a marketing concept in which advertisers
are able to divide the population into small segments
with comparable personality traits and preferences. By
doing so, it is possible to more narrowly advertise to a
specific group rather than to a mass audience, which is
usually more expensive [10]. Traditionally, advertising
cost prices have been determined by the amount of
exposure the advertising medium yields, i.e. how many
people watch a tv ad or pass by a billboard. With
micro-segmentation, advertisers can ignore all those
who have no interest in the product being advertised,
and instead push to persuade those who are already
inclined to listen [11].
Psychometrics can be viewed as a tool that places
individuals into micro-segments. By attributing certain
traits and behaviors to an individual, social media
platforms can build a so-called “social profile” on a
user, bundle users from a certain segment together and
offer advertisers an audience that is already interested
in the product they want to sell [1].
Facebook’s use of psychometrics for advertising
purposes has been revealed by journalists [12] and
even by one of its own former program managers, who
helped construct the psychometric system on the
world’s largest social media platform. In fact, while
describing a (since abandoned) tool constructed by the
Facebook data team which used data to recommend
Facebook Pages to users, Garcia-Martinez [13] asks a
question that is perfectly relevant to the discussion in
this paper. The algorithm of the tool in question would
start “..spitting out…Every ethnic stereotype you can
imagine”. As Noble [14], Srinivasan [15] and many
others have shown, this type of bias often occurs in
algorithms considered transparent by their makers,

leading to the current wave of algorithmic critique in
information and communications studies as well as
related fields. Garcia-Martinez’ data-centric approach
leads him to state that “Sometimes data behaves
unethically” which shifts the normative gaze from the
interpretation of data to the data itself. Assigning
agency to data in this manner is problematic, but this
related discussion will have to be dealt with in a
separate paper. It is Garcia-Martinez’ following
question that is of relevance to the present discussion:
“African Americans living in postal codes with
depressed
incomes
likely
do
respond
disproportionately to ads for usurious “payday” loans.
Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 25 probably do
engage with ads singing the charms and advantages of
military service. Why should those examples of
targeting be viewed as any less ethical than, say, ads
selling $100 Lululemon yoga pants targeting
thirtysomething women in affluent postal codes like
San Francisco’s Marina district?” [13, 13th para.]
One response to this question might be: “Because
there is such a thing as marketing ethics”. Murphy [16]
provides an excellent overview of the many decades of
work building ethical frameworks for marketing. The
ethical discussion within marketing is almost a
reflection of the ethics field itself, with the tools and
conditions of the marketing sphere being considered
through the lenses of the main schools of ethics and
moral philosophy.
One of these, pertinent to this paper, is the
deontological, contract-based theories of John Rawls.
Several scholars have applied Rawls’ work to business
and marketing [17],[18],[19]. In particular, Freeman
[20] expands Rawls’ conception of a fair contract to
business contracts. Freeman writes that a contract is
only fair, “if the parties to the contract would agree to
it in ignorance of their actual stakes”, echoing Rawls’
“veil of ignorance” concept [21], through which one
must consider the conditions of a social contract if
fairness is to be achieved.
This raises the question: Is the contract that e.g.
Facebook enters into with the user a fair one? There is
no need to consider a conceptual contract here, a very
real one comes into existence, every time a user
registers with Facebook and accepts the terms and
conditions of using the service. The ethics of these
end-user license agreements and similar texts have
been discussed elsewhere, particularly in light of the
privacy concerns they give rise to [3],[10]. Most
scholars agree on one point: Though the pervasiveness
of social media may apply pressure on the individual to
engage with them or become a social outcast [22],[23],
the decision still rests with the individual. It is the
decision and responsibility of the individual user to
accept or decline the conditions under which the user
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partakes in the services offered by social media
companies. The cost/benefit analysis of what a user
gets in return for giving away personal information and
agreeing to become exposed to targeted advertising is
important, but irrelevant in this paper.
Based on Freeman’s use of Rawls above, one can
argue that entering into a contract with a social media
company like the one referenced here is an unfair
proposition. The problem is that this argument hinges
on what the needs of the individual are. Where Rawls
argues for fair social contracts in a society that it is
difficult for individuals to abandon, it is entirely
possible to avoid using social media (at least until the
time of writing). Unlike basic Internet access or
ownership of a cell phone, which Schroeder and Ling
[24] likens to a Durkheimian social fact, we have not
yet arrived at a point where engagements with social
media platforms are necessary to function as a citizen
in society. You don’t need to be on Twitter to pay your
taxes or need an Instagram account to vote. And not
having a Facebook account may in fact be beneficial
when you apply for some types of jobs.
Thus, when commercial social media platforms use
psychometrics for advertising, it is something the user
accepts freely when entering into the contract with that
platform. There may be ethical issues related to the
platform changing the conditions without alerting the
user, not upholding their part of the contract, selling
psychometric data to third parties without informing
the user or not making it clear that psychometric
profiling is taking place. But if all users enter into the
contract fully informed about the nature of the
relationship between social media platform and the
individual user, Rawls provides no basis for the
argument that the use of psychometrics is unethical for
commercial purposes.

3. Psychometrics in political
persuasion on social media
When it comes to using psychometrics in social
media as persuasive tactics for political or strategic
purposes, conditions are different, and there are other
ethical concerns at play. As mentioned above, it is
entirely possible to be a citizen in society without
engaging with social media – at least in most Western
countries at the time of writing. But it is substantially
more difficult to disengage from society altogether.
When we discuss Rawlsian, deontological ethics, we
do so within the frame of a society being constructed
with fairness as a guiding principle. Although
philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger point to
ethics that exist regardless of the interactions of
humans [25], the type of deontological ethics discussed
in this paper are related to behaviors in which humans

have some sort of impact on each other, on animals and
on the environment. When discussing whether the use
of psychometrics in social media can be ethical, it is
pointless to consider the singular individual outside
society, since both psychometrics and social media are
contingent on interactions of humans. I shall therefore,
going forward in the discussion, disregard any
hypothetical situation in which society does not exist,
or where the individual can abandon society with ease.
Upon the acceptance of the existence of a society in
which psychometrics can be used in social media, the
Rawlsian question then becomes: Is it fair to use
psychometrics in social media, given that we strive for
a just society? Can a society that holds fairness as a
guiding principle allow for the use of psychometrics in
social media when the intent is political?
Rawls is quite clear on this point. For a society to
be just, it must be “well-ordered” [26, pp. 8]. This
means that the basic principles governing individuals
and society, chosen by those who constructed the
society, must be transparent to the citizen. The
mechanisms of the system of governance must be clear
to the citizen, and citizens must be able to participate in
these mechanisms. This does not mean, e.g. that law
enforcement in society must be completely transparent
and nothing can be classified. But it does mean that
citizens must find transparency in the mechanisms
through which something is kept secret from them, and
must agree that this ability should be given to law
enforcement. [26].
In other words, Rawls argues that in a just and fair
society, citizens must be able to monitor the
mechanisms of democracy to ensure that society stays
“well-ordered”, and they must have access to the
information needed to do so. Here, we hit upon the first
challenge when it comes to the use of psychometrics in
social media in situations of political persuasion. I
argue that the precise targeting of information delivery
may isolate the citizen from other information sources,
if the volume of the information delivered through
targeting is so high that it effectively drowns out other
sources.

3.1. The case of Michigan in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election
During the 2016 presidential election campaign in
the U.S., the state of Michigan was key to Donald
Trump’s victory. It was also one of the states where
Trump’s victory was smallest, with only a 0.2%
voteshare advantage over his opponent, Hillary
Clinton. It seems fair to assume that with such a small
margin, the breadth of events that could have
contributed to the result taking one direction or the
other is substantial. In the jigsaw puzzle of variables
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that caused Trump to gain this small advantage, it
would likely not take the removal or reversal of more
than a few variables for the advantage to shrink.
Thus, the information available to the voters may
have been crucial in deciding the Michigan vote. A
direct causality between the particular constitution of
the information made available to Michigan voters and
the result cannot be established. But it is not
unreasonable to assume that the available information
would be at least a part of the equation.
Looking at the state of Michigan in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, Kominska et al. [27] found that
misleading “junk news” was being shared as often as
“professional” news, both making up approximately
33% of the total content shared in the days leading up
to the election. In other words, even if you ignore the
existence of filter bubbles and echo chambers [28] and
assume that every voter is equally exposed to the
different sources of information, every other piece of
election-related news given to the voters in Michigan
through social media, would be false. The Michigan
voters who primarily got their news from social media,
would literally only get half the story. The other half of
the story was an attempt to sway them in a particular
direction.
This is a clear violation of Rawls’ rule on the
transparency of democratic mechanisms and the
citizens’ ability to obtain the necessary information to
express themselves in a democratic system. By
ensuring that half of the information made available to
voters is in fact misinformation, citizens’ ability to
express themselves this way is clearly impeded.
Now, most voters do not get all their information
from social media, just a substantial part of it [29].
Also, as mentioned above, voters can freely choose not
to engage in social media without disengaging from
society. However, even if voters choose to do so, the
spillover effect from social media into other types of
news media as well as interpersonal communication is
enough, I argue, to still have a powerful impact on the
general information consumption of voters. This can be
seen in studies of how so-called “fake news” stories
were picked up by traditional media after first having
appeared on social media [30],[31].
In other words, whether or not the individual is
actively engaging with social media or not, is
somewhat irrelevant. The impact on the generally
available information pool happens regardless, and so a
citizen who is not on social media, would still – to
some extent – use social media-borne information to
make a voting decision. Therefore, it is essential to
understand how social media persuasion happens, and
related to this paper, and which part psychometrics
play.

3.2. When psychometrics entered political
social media campaigning.
In 2015, Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell published
a paper to much attention that showed how software
was able to predict personality traits more effectively
than humans, at least within the confines set by the
paper [32]. Using only users’ Facebook Likes as the
main source of data, computers running predictive
analytics software were able to place users more
accurately within the so-called Big Five model than the
users’ Facebook friends could. The Big Five or FiveFactor psychometrics model measures the prevalence
of five personality traits that spell OCEAN: Openness
to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion,
Agreeableness and Neuroticism [33]. 86,220
participants would fill out a 100-item questionnaire
that was used to score the different traits, and this selfevaluation was then compared to Big Five scores
provided by Facebook friends with varying relations to
the participants as well as the above-mentioned
software basing its evaluation on Likes.
The computer-based evaluations had an average
accuracy of 0.56 compared to an average accuracy of
0.49 in the human evaluation. This caught the attention
of the media, but also of Alexandr Kogan, an assistant
professor from the same psychology department at
Cambridge where the above study was performed.
Kogan had started a consulting company and wanted to
license the model used in the study, but was turned
down. However, based on his knowledge of the model,
Kogan then provided a similar model to Strategic
Communications Laboratories (SCL), a company that
uses psychological modeling to influence voter groups.
In 2013, Cambridge Analytica was formed as a
subsidiary of SCL meant to specifically work on U.S.
elections. They were hired by the 2016 campaigns of
Ted Cruz and Donald Trump, and have also been
connected to the Leave campaign in the UK “Brexit”
referendum [4].
Beirle et al. [34] point to the widespread belief that
Cambridge Analytica and their version of the model
that originated with Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell,
played a significant, if not essential part in the election
of Donald Trump – something that Cambridge
Analytica have also claimed themselves.

3.3. Psychometrics, social media and
democracy
Don Fallis [35] points to the necessity of equal
access to information in fair society. All three argue
that Rawls’ veil of ignorance entails equal access to
information, as it would be impossible for those
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constructing a fair society to do so without information
about the stakes. The whole point of the veil of
ignorance, in these authors’ view, is to make decisions
without any preconceptions or prior knowledge, but
with the stakeholders possessing a similar level of
information. Van den Hoven and Rooksby [36] argue
specifically that access to information is a candidate to
be one of Rawls’ primary goods, i.e. something that
everyone has a right to obtain in a fair and just society,
and which is essential to the individual’s performance
of citizenship.
But Rawls is in fact even more specific in his
assertion that in order to assert their political liberties
and make use of their primary goods in the democratic
process, there is a need for ”assurance of a more even
access to public media” [26 pp. 149]. Rawls sees it as
imperative that there is equal access to the educational
resources necessary to make informed decisions in the
deliberative process he calls “Public Reason” [37, pp.
216].

4. Violations
Here, we hit upon the first of the two ways in which
use of psychometrics in political campaigning on social
media violate Rawlsian ethics.
It is tempting to believe that there are almost no
limits on spaces to store or relay information on the
Internet. Even if you assume that to be the case, the
emergence of the ‘attention economy’ [38],[39],[40]
showed that there is clearly a limit to how much users
of online services can consume of the information
presented to them online. The persuasion game in
online media is thus a zero-sum game. For persuaders
in the online sphere, part of the mission is to succeed in
presenting their information in a way that blocks out
competing information that may invalidate the
persuaders’ viewpoints. This is exactly what targeted
political campaigning excels in, and in particular the
campaigns that use psychometrics. As mentioned
above, machine learning-based psychometric targeting
has been shown to target the individual better than
humans, thus creating a situation where tailor-made
information is relayed at the individual level on social
media.
Now consider the situation as seen in Michigan,
where just as much misinformation was presented to
the individual as information. Taking a cue from
Luciano Floridi [41], and assuming that untruthful
information is in fact not information at all, but
misinformation, this means that the individual targeted
by psychometric-based campaigning is deprived of the
full and free access to factual information required to
participate in the democratic process as Rawls
understands it, at least insofar the individual uses social

media to access such information. Of course, in Rawls’
ideal scenario, a more even access to public media
would counterbalance this, and a citizen would always
be able to draw information from public media instead
of commercial, social media. However, it is clear that
more people now retrieve news and other information
used in the democratic process from social media than
public media, at least in the U.S. [29]. So is it not just a
question of educating the public to not trust social
media for this kind of information?

4.1. Expectations of transparency
I argue that it is not, in light of the expectations of
users when accessing this type of information on social
media. Using once again the example of Facebook, the
company and its representatives have stated several
times that they wish for the platform to be an objective
and transparent venue for debate in which all sides can
be equally represented in a pluralist vision not unlike
Rawls’ [21],[26],[37]. There has been much critique of
the assumed objectivity and transparency of social
media platforms [2],[14],[15],[22] but for the sake of
the argument, I will go forward with the assumption
that the social media platforms in question have pure
intentions in this regard and are at least working
towards such a vision.
Facebook’s terms and conditions for advertisers
[44] as well as their community guidelines [43] are
quite clear. Advertisers cannot make statements that
are factually incorrect or is intended to mislead the
public. This is also applicable to advertising in the
shape of sponsored posts to users’ news feeds. Those
using psychometrics to target users
with
misinformation or ‘fake news’ are thus in violation of
Facebook’s rules. However, much of this
misinformation is also spread through sock puppet
(fake) accounts, enabling a peer-to-peer virality. This is
also in violation of Facebook’s rules, this time the
terms and conditions for users [42] as well as the
community guidelines.
I am not attempting to state the obvious here, that
sources of fake news and misinformation on Facebook
are in violation of Facebook’s own rules. But I argue
that users cannot be blamed for expecting those rules to
be followed by others and enforced by Facebook so
that breaking them have consequences. Whether
Facebook actually does this is a matter for another
paper.

4.2. Hijacking users’ information sources to
transmit misinformation
If users have a reasonable expectation that
Facebook’s own vision of transparency and pluralism
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is foundational to the platform, and the rules are there
to inhibit the spread of misinformation, the burden is –
initially, at least - not on the users to separate
misinformation from information. A pragmatic
solution to the current problem maybe such a higher
level of media and information literacy, but from the
standpoint of Rawlsian basic principles for a wellordered, just and fair society, hijacking (as in
Michigan) half of the information available and instead
presenting misinformation blocks citizens’ abilities to
express themselves as citizens.
The role of psychometrics here is the hijacking
part. It is important here to note that not all
misinformation, fake news or junk news being spread
in Michigan came from the Trump campaign.
However, according to both Anderson and Horvath
[50] and Grusin [51], some of it did, and was
distributed to users through micro-segmentation
methods employing psychometrics. Psychometrics are
unique in this manner, since they enable targeting so
precise that it is possible for misinformation to crowd
out information presented to the user. This is less
problematic with commercial advertising, as the user
freely accepts this as part of the contract when
engaging with a social media platform. But the user
has no expectation of political campaigning using
psychometrics, and is not free to disengage from the
effect of social media campaigning, as it impacts the
entire societal debate in which Rawlsian public
reasoning should be taking place.
Again, the user is free to leave social media or
ignore advertising, but to be a moral citizen who
participates in the democratic process, as Rawls
prescribes, the user must be open to an array of
viewpoints [26],[37] and therefore cannot simply tune
out.

4.3. Uneven
information
definition

access

by

Could psychometrics-based political campaigning
on social media be used in ways that benefit the
citizen’s ability to participate in the manner Rawls
considers to be that person’s duty? I argue that it
cannot, and this brings me to the second way that this
sort of use of psychometrics is in violation of Rawlsian
principles.
As mentioned above, Rawls considers it imperative
to the free expression of a citizen’s political liberty that
there is an even access to public media. The word
“even” is important here, as it relates to the equities
that dominate Rawls’ work. The purpose of
psychometrics in political campaigning on social
media is to tailor the message as much as possible to

the individual user. This is, at its very foundation, a
principle of inequity and asymmetry.
One of the few areas in which Rawls agrees with
his contemporaries Habermas and Foucault [45], is that
there can be imbalances in communication between
sender and receiver and that these imbalances can be
expressed in power relations. At for least Rawls and
Habermas, this touches upon the ethicality of
democratic discourse itself, with Rawls arguing that
citizens must enter freely and equally into the public
reasoning [37] and Habermas arguing that any sort of
discourse in the public sphere must be held to certain
norms of truthfulness and fairness for it to benefit
democracy [46].
Use of psychometrics in political social media
campaigns runs counter to this. Not only does the
extreme precision and individual-level addressing of
the user have the ability to crowd out other viewpoints
and reduce the amount of pluralism in the discourse as
mentioned above. It also automatically creates a power
asymmetry that would not be acceptable under Rawls’
and Habermas’ doctrines of democratic discourse
mentioned above. They both argue for equity in the
discourse, but if a user only sees one aspect of one
viewpoint, while another user sees another, singular
aspect of that same viewpoint because of this type of
ultra-precise targeting, this equity does not exist, as
one user may not have access to the same information
given to the other.
Even if one viewed the citizen’s attention as a
battleground to be fought over through hypertargeting,
lack of access to the amounts of data required to
produce reliable psychometrics would be a barrier for
grassroots organizations or smaller players in the
political landscape that are essential to the pluralism
advocated for by Rawls. This structure would be very
much contingent on previously established positions of
power, which runs contrary to how Rawls argues a fair
and just society is built.
In other words, this is problematic even when the
communication does not involve misinformation. It is
merely a principle of inequity at the heart of hypertargeted
political
communication,
of
which
psychometrics is the instrument du jour.
Once again, the use of psychometrics in
commercial advertising is different from political
campaigning: It may be important to you but from
socio-ethical standpoint, it does not matter if you see
all the bike advertisements targeted towards you before
you purchase a bike. However, in the Rawlsian
framework, a well-ordered, democratic society requires
its citizens to have access to all the viewpoints they
have to choose between, and filtering out some for the
purpose of effectiveness of messaging is thus
unethical.
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5. Conclusion
There are many other ethical aspects of the use of
psychometrics in targeted advertising on social media
not discussed here. One example is the fact that
psychometric methods such as the ‘Big Five’ method
mentioned above can be viewed as partial
psychoanalysis or part of a larger psychological,
diagnostic process. That takes the discussion in the
ethics of involuntary psychological assessment, which
is something the mental health field has grappled with
for a long time [47],[48],[49]. Closer to the
communication, media and information studies fields,
it can also be debated whether psychometrics should be
used in any sort of communication tactic, particularly
with the emergence of location- and identity aware
media platforms in public spaces. Is it okay for the
billboard that sees you coming to address your needs
on a very individualized level, based on who your
psychometrics say you are? What happens when
psychometric measurement in advertising and
persuasion reveals something about that you don’t
know yourself yet? Another discussion is the longrunning debate over social profiles which reaches back
before psychometrics entered the picture, and which
raises questions about the consequences of defining a
person by what can almost certainly only be part of a
larger picture, even with the best psychometrics in
place.
These, and many other discussions will likely flare
up in the future as psychometrics and other means of
hypertargeting take up larger and larger roles in our
daily lives. In this article, I have focused on the
practice of using psychometrics for political
persuasion, using social media to both collect data
about, but also directly reach individual citizens. I have
argued how, in a Rawlsian perspective, using
psychometrics in this manner may lead to at least two
different situations in which the access to information
required to fulfill a citizen’s democratic duties is
impeded and/or unequal. A plausible future exploration
of the matter would entail exploring other ethical
schools of thought than that of Rawls’, such as a
utilitarian or libertarian view of the matter.
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